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Abstract The paper aims at analyzing three Arab regimes which since 2011 
have experienced mass protests. Before the outbreak of such pro-
tests, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria shared some common characteri-
stics which made these countries eligible for broad comparison: 
the existence of a hegemonic party, broad repressive apparatuses 
and an important public sector. By exploring the different rela-
tions between the state, the party and the military before the cri-
sis it should be possible to assess whether the establishment of a 
liberal democracy is a real perspective or not. How the properties 
of previous regimes impact on the eventual outcome of a political 
crisis is one of the most debated topics in the literature. As wor-
king hypotheses, we could pose that the limited role of the army is 
more likely to favor a democratic evolution in the Tunisian case, 
whereas the absent or even partial separation of the military from 
state and party institutions in the other two cases makes this per-
spective more uncertain.
Keywords Arab regimes, transitions, democracy, authoritarianism, 
ruling coalition, civil-military relations.
Sintesi Questo saggio analizza tre regimi arabi che a partire dal 2011 
hanno conosciuto fenomeni di proteste di massa. Tunisia, Egitto e 
Siria condividevano, infatti, alcune caratteristiche che ne facilita-
no la comparazione: l’esistenza di un partito in posizione egemo-
nica, l’estensione degli apparati repressivi e un settore pubblico 
importante. Analizzando l’intensità delle relazioni tra lo Stato, il 
partito e l’apparato militare prima della crisi è possibile, dunque, 
determinare le concrete possibilità di evoluzione verso una forma 
di democrazia liberale. Le eredità lasciate dal regime precedente 
sono, infatti, in letteratura uno dei fattori più importanti per le 
implicazioni successive. Il ruolo limitato dell’esercito, nel caso 
tunisino, e la sua separazione dal partito e dallo Stato rendono, 
dunque, questo caso più promettente.
Parole chiave Regimi arabi, transizioni, democrazia, autoritarismi, 
coalizioni di potere, relazioni civili-militari.
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1. Introduction
Crisis of authoritarianism can lead to democratization, but the perspectives of 
transition and democratic consolidation are uncertain or at least affected by the 
permanence of factors and actors which characterized the previous regime (Linz 
and Stepan 1996). The aim of the present paper is to assess the chances of transition 
in three Arab polities – Tunisia, Egypt and Syria – considering the relation between 
state, (“hegemonic”) parties and the military apparatuses before the beginning of 
the crisis. These cases have been selected according to some common features. 
First of all, they all were republics. Second, although some of them partially 
displayed the characters which Beblawi and Luciani (1987) identified for rentier 
states, they could hardly be defined as such. Indeed, rents were limited and played 
only a residual role helping to maintain the crucial function of curbing dissent by 
the repressive apparatuses. However, they were not of such importance to ensure 
the maintenance of the regime1. Third, and most important, they all displayed 
with variations a strong interrelation between the state machine, the party in 
power and the military/repressive apparatuses. These conditions have evolved 
over the years but remained important at the beginning of the crisis. 
We will proceed as follows. In the second chapter we will examine the litera-
ture on authoritarianism in the region. In particular we will try to answer the 
question why authoritarian regimes have been able to survive in a world grow-
ingly marked by democratic legitimacy. The inadequacy of the ‘transition para-
digm’ has been challenged in the literature (Carothers 2002). While Middle East 
countries had endorsed some liberalization, they still remained authoritarian 
(Hinnebusch 2006). Autocrats proved to be ‘adaptable’ (Stacher 2012). Regime 
transformation has been labeled as an ‘upgrading’ authoritarianism (Heydemann 
2007). Regimes were able to endure simply by putting under control liberaliza-
tion to the advantage of a narrowing elite. Nonetheless, the crisis of legitimacy 
proved to be so profound to detonate in a precise moment with a snowballing 
effect (Huntington 1991: 102) emanated from Tunisia to finally contaminate the 
entire region. Whether such regimes could evolve to stable democracies is debat-
able (Valbjørn 2012; Hinnebusch 2013). 
We will limit our analysis to the selected cases. It is well accepted in the litera-
ture on the Middle East that beyond some common features the political out-
comes of the democratization process in these cases are more likely variegated 
(Hinnebusch 2013).
The third chapter examines the three regimes before their crisis, focusing 
on their analogies. We do believe that the shared characteristics explain why 
1 It may be true, perhaps, that some of the regimes under investigation pursued a “rentier 
strategy” in a condition of rents’ decline (for the role of rent in Egypt, see Richter 2007). Monar-
chies have generally shown a greater capacity to resist to opposition demands posed by the new 
challenges. The reasons for that are various and will not be explored. However, most of them 
completely fall into the typology of the rentier state.
6such regimes have survived so far and how the paths of state formation have 
hampered their evolution after the Arab uprising.
The fourth chapter investigates the relations between the military apparatuses, 
the state and the party2. The three regimes are considered according to the weight 
of these “pillars”. In particular, following Huntington (1968: 12-24), it is possible 
to “measure” the degree of institutionalization of these three pillars along four 
axes: the degree of mutual autonomy, their internal coherence, complexity 
and adaptability. The fifth chapter argues about the effects of the economic 
liberalization since the 90s. Its impact has either reduced (at least partially) the 
economic weight of the military apparatus (in the Egyptian and Syrian cases) or 
created the pre-conditions for the development of a middle class that has grown 
autonomously from the state (Egypt and Tunisia). In the conclusion, some general 
evaluations on the possibility of a positive outcome will be made by considering 
how such transitions have started. We can anticipate that, besides the analogies, 
differences proved to be significant and, at least, in the Tunisian case, the lesser 
weight of the military makes a democratic evolution more likely. Conversely, the 
absence, or even the only partial separation between the state and the military 
makes this perspective uncertain in the other two cases.
2. Literature: How State Formation Has Shaped the Future of Arab Countries
The crisis of the authoritarian regimes has been hastened by the fall of the Berlin 
wall in 1989. The end of communist regimes intensified the problem of legiti-
mization of authoritarianism in a world increasingly marked by the acceptance 
of democratic values (Huntington 1991: 45). Since then, democracy has become 
the most widespread political regime. Exceptions were the Arab political systems 
(Stepan and Robertson 2003; Diamond 2010) after an initial and very partial 
liberalization at the beginning of the 90s (Salamé 1994). Such exceptions have 
challenged the ‘transition paradigm’ and questioned its adequacy to the Mid-
dle Eastern states (Carothers 2002). In particular such paradigm, based mainly 
on the influential work of O’Donnel and Schmitter (1986), relied on five tenets, 
the most important being that transition to democracy was an unavoidable and 
universal trend, that transition necessarily led toward a form of established de-
mocracy, the determinative importance of elections and the poor weight of the 
underlying condition, such as political history, institutional legacies, and other 
‘structural’ features in defining the outcome of the transition process (Carothers 
2002: 6-8; Mahoney 2000). On the contrary, it was found that the Arab autocrats 
proved to be very adaptable. Ways of adaptation vary (Stacher 2012). However a 
2 An important part of the literature concerning the regimes of the region confirms this ap-
proach. For Tunisia see Camau and Geisser (2003); for Syria see Perthes (2004: 12); for Egypt see 
Cook (2007).
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common ground was the ability of managing transition, in particular economic 
liberalization, to avoid full political liberalization to the advantage of those in 
power. According to Hinnebusch (2006: 380-386) populist authoritarian (PA) re-
gimes such as those here considered were able to adjust themselves in order to 
survive, evolving to a form of post-populist authoritarianism (PPA). Such chang-
es were not completely ineffectual on the shape of the ruling coalitions (Heyde-
mann 2004), but the pillars on which regimes relied remained largely the same. 
Notwithstanding that, at least one core assumption of the transition paradigm 
was true: the same old regimes, having lost their populist appeal, had now to face 
the problem of democratic legitimacy. Popular demands which arose during the 
Arab uprising enlightened therefore a profound lack of legitimacy, while the tim-
ing of such uprisings (beginning of 2011) were certainly linked to a succession 
problem (at least in Egypt and Tunisia) that we will not investigate any further.
The same pillars of the former or current ruling coalitions remain as impor-
tant underlying conditions to influence the future outcomes. The concept of rul-
ing coalitions offers a tool to capture the logic of political organizations in other-
wise varying systems of rule3. Exploring the relations between the state, i.e. their 
bureaucratic apparatuses, the military institution and the parties, it is possible 
to investigate the inner relations of such coalitions. We believe that from this 
perspective it is possible to identify possible paths of transitions. Structures and 
organizations do therefore count and endure crisis or transition to question the 
direction of the transition, to close off certain solutions to the benefit of others. 
Such an approach that could be defined as “neo-institutionalist” (March & Olsen 
1984) remains the most convincing one since bureaucracies, military apparatuses 
and other organizations shape attitudes, expectations and demands towards so-
lutions which may confirm or not the transition paradigm. We do not deny the 
importance of other functional or less functional factors that lead to a democratic 
outcome – the duration of a transition, the degree of violence before and during 
the transition, the role of civil actors, the degree of participation, etc. – variously 
described by others (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986, Przeworski 1991) but we be-
lieve that the importance of the analysis of the ruling coalition of an authoritarian 
regimes is, by itself, sufficient to outline the possible path of transition, therefore 
limiting the description to few factors that will be more systematically treated.
Getting rid of the old élites is, indeed, problematic for the new leaderships 
which emerge after the transition. The military could indeed keep veto powers. 
This is broadly outlined in literature (Linz and Stepan 1996: 65-8). On the other 
hand, also a substantial part of the old political class that came from former single 
(or hegemonic) parties, especially the second ranks, could still play a role by sim-
ply recycling itself into new political forms. The members of the former single 
parties continue old political cultures in a democratized shape. Furthermore the 
tendency to recur to patronage, the lack of democratic commitment, the predispo-
3 On coalition formation in non-democracies see Acemoglu et al. (2009).
8sition to polarize on values, the propensity to manipulate elections when deeply 
embedded as political cultures are all factors which may influence or retard demo-
cratic consolidation4. Besides we may wonder whether the low legitimization of 
a certain type of authoritarianism – in various ways centered on clientelistic and/
or ubiquitous parties and powerful military apparatuses – will cast the basis of 
democratization or will give way to different authoritarian outcomes. The char-
acteristics of the previous regime interact and shape also the factors mentioned 
above – the duration, the degree of violence before and during the transition, the 
degree of participation.  As we will see, differences in the structure of power and 
of relations between the institutions that formed the ruling coalition in the three 
countries can be largely explained by some historical differences that we shall 
briefly describe in chapter four. We will argue that the degree of “fusion” between 
these structures/organizations will adversely affect any democratic possibility. In 
particular ‘fusion’ will be intended as the opposite of the institutionalization as 
developed by Huntington (1968: 13-17), much in the sense that they lack mutual 
autonomy. Once recognized that institutions do matter, the authoritarian resil-
ience or the ability to veto by some apparatuses is explained as the result of their 
strength much more than their institutionalization.5 In other words, such struc-
tures maintain their influence not only because they have the power to do so but 
also because they are not autonomous.
3. State, Party and Security Apparatuses: The Analogies 
The three political systems under consideration show some analogies that facili-
tate a comparison. In this chapter we will concentrate on these ones and neglect, 
for the moment, the differences. The existence of these similarities is emphasized 
also by other authors. For example Kamrava (2000) by classifying Middle-Eastern 
regimes places our cases in the same category – “Autocratic officer-politicians re-
gimes” – and in the same sub-category – “Mukhaberat states”. The three regimes, 
plus Yemen, are characterized by a mixed type – civil-military – where the role 
played by the internal security apparatuses (mukhaberat) is taken in serious con-
sideration. The typology provided by Kamrava is scarcely useful in our case and it 
is not fully convincing as it excludes two cases close to ours such as Iraq of Saddam 
Hussein and Algeria before the coup d’etat of 1992. However, it sets these cases into 
the right perspective. Three are the features that make them similar:
a. The existence of a wide state and bureaucracy that, despite recent downsizing 
and liberalization at least in one case (Tunisia since the 90s), kept a decisive 
importance as a driving instrument for economic and social development;
4 What Ottaway (2004) referred to as a lack of ‘democratic constituency’.
5 This perspective is outlined by Battera (2012) and Ieraci (2013a, 2013b).
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b. The existence of a hegemonic party (Sartori 1976). The party had initially a 
mobilizing role during the consolidation of the state to later become a patro-
nage machine. The party has been an instrument of élites’ cooptation by se-
lecting new demands and an instrument of societal control (for the Tunisian 
case see Hibou 2006);
c. A crucial role assigned to the internal security apparatuses and/or, with a si-
milar role, to the military (Bellin 2004). Some differences, however, emerge 
since after the “forced retirement” of Bourguiba in 1987 the Tunisian army 
almost entirely ceased to play a role of internal control: it became growingly 
professionalized by limiting its task to the defense of national territory. On 
the contrary, armies in Syria and Egypt acquired such powers to the extent of 
a direct control of important parts of the economy (and of the society).
These three pillars are decisive to understand the direction of the transitions, 
since: a) in the absence of a capable state, transition is more likely at risk; b) heavy 
military apparatuses can jeopardize or affect in a decisive way the outcomes 
(Agüero 1995 and Pion-Berlin 1997); c) also former single/hegemonic parties can 
maintain a remarkable conditioning power. Moreover, when parties previously 
in power were clientelistic, the vacuum of power left by them at the beginning of 
the transition could be easily filled by new emerging parties which might show 
paradoxically the same characteristics6: territorial anchorage and capacity of 
mobilization and redistribution.
All the three regimes experienced a remarkable growth of state bureaucracy 
during the 60s-70s (Owen 2004: 23-38). This was confirmed by the growth of the 
expenditures of the central governments (on GDP) which grew from 29.7% in 
1960 (18.3% in 1955) for Egypt to 55.7% in 1970. A similar growth is recorded also 
for Syria – from 23.5% to 37.9%  – and for Tunisia – from 20.7% to 40.7% –  during 
the same decade (Owen 2004: 25). Although in the Egyptian case expenditures 
experienced a contraction during the 80s due to the liberalization policy (infitah) 
of Sadat, the weight of the state remained substantial (they still reached a peak 
in 1992 : 57.5%)7. Public employment was rated around 6 million during the 00s 
(9.58% of the population and about 1/3 of the total employees) with over 800.000 
employees in the armed forces (a man every 84 citizens; 180.000 in 1966) and 
150.000 policemen (UN-DPADM 2004).
The enlargement of state bureaucracy in Syria occurred during the same 
decade: while in 1960 the state employed only 34.000 public employees, this 
number grew to 251.000 in 1975. More recent estimations counted about 1.2 
million public employees and 400.000 retired (Bar 2006: 427). To these figures, 
6  See for Egypt the revealing article by Vannetzel (2007).
7 Source: FMI.
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180.000 men from the armed forces must be added since the 70s, and a total of 
over 400.000 during the 00s (a man in arms every 43 citizens). That means about 
half of the entire workforce (25% in the Egyptian case).
Tunisia experienced a similar process of expansion. The bureaucracy grew 
from 80.000 in 1960 to nearly half a million during the mid-90s (including the 
employees in state controlled companies). However, diversely from the cases 
described above, the army remained of modest size – before the crisis it was about 
47.000 men in arms (1 every 212 citizens) – since both Ben Ali and Bourguiba 
feared a possible coup d’etat. Nevertheless, the internal security apparatuses – the 
Sûreté nationale – amounted between 50.000 and 80.000 men before the regime 
breakdown in 2011. In this case only, the ratio between the armed forces and the 
police was inverted. This was due to the greater importance in the ruling coalition 
assigned to the Ministry of interior in the Tunisian case (Ben Ali himself came from 
the Ministry of interior and not from the military as Hafiz al-Assad and Mubarak)8.
The policies of liberalization had also different outcomes. Started in the 70s, 
liberal reforms in Egypt and Tunisia were strengthened at the beginning of the 
90s under the presidencies of Mubarak and Ben Ali. In Syria, liberal reforms 
introduced during the 00s under the presidency of Bashar upset the internal 
power balances as we will consider in the two following chapters. However, the 
effects were different in terms of the weight of public employment between 1988 
and 1998 (WB 2004: 98): while in Tunisia during that decade there had been a 
modest contraction of public employment, in Egypt a further increase was 
recorded. In Egypt the state continued to be an essential dispenser of services and 
the main employer in the non-agricultural sector and, generally, state expenses 
for salaries and pensions continued to grow. The only important cut was that for 
subsides of some primary goods that have damaged the purchasing power of the 
poorest classes (Richter 2007: 184 and 187). 
Nearly the same holds true for Syria: the public sector continued to dominate 
the petrochemical industry, the banks and half of the manufacturing production. 
Although before the crisis 75% of the workforce in the manufacturing sector was 
privately employed, the state continued to limit heavily the role of the private 
sector by keeping the size of private firms (Perthes 2004: 30-31).
According to Ayubi (2009: 289-328) these regimes shared the same étatiste 
approach9, the central role played by the armed forces or, alternatively, the internal 
security apparatuses, and the leading role of the hegemonic party. Besides formal 
multipartitism – electoral processes lacked any credibility –, through the ban of 
the religious parties (i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood and its national branches) and 
8 Despite its separation from the other two pillars of power – the bureaucracy and the party 
– according to Camau and Geisser (2003: 207 and 211) the army remained a group of interests 
that central power had necessarily to take into account.
9 Here and there in the text we use the term “socialist” policies, although we do not mean a 
total nationalization of economic activities, as together with the public sector in all three cases 
a modest private sector persisted since the independence.
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the granting to the oppositions of a 20% of the legislature seats, the Tunisian RCD 
(ex PSD under Bourguiba) maintained in fact a steady control of the parliaments, 
similarly to the Egyptian NDP. We cannot be deceived by the low formal 
affiliation to the Ba‘ath in the Syrian parliament (54%). Only 14% of the seats was 
assigned to other parties which were part of the National Progressive Front (al-
Jabha) dominated by the Ba‘ath party, while the residual parliamentarians were 
unaffiliated MPs that were subject to the approval of the Ba’ath10. 
In all three cases, the hegemonic parties deeply penetrated the society through 
an all-pervading structure of local branches endowed with the redistribution of 
resources to loyal citizens. Some evaluations put a million registered members 
for the Tunisian PSD in the middle of the 80s (Camau and Geisser 2003: 181). 
These figures remained nearly the same with the subsequent RCD at the moment 
of the regime breakdown. In the Syrian case, the figures for the Ba‘ath party 
were relatively more modest in relation to the population that is the double as 
that of Tunisia at least until the middle of the 80s: about 500.000 members in 
1985 (Van Dam 2011: 128). This was partially due to a more selective recruiting 
procedure11. In fact, such selective procedures seemed to have been abandoned 
later on. According to the data reported by Bar (2006: 359) during the beginning 
of Bashar tenure, the party members were around 1.8 million (18% of the adult 
population)12. However, this expansion of the dominant parties in the society, in 
all the three cases, marked in fact the decline of the party as a decisional body and 
its rise as a mere instrument of patronage.
The relation with the oppositions was ruled through cooptation (Ottaway and 
Choucair-Vizoso 2008). If in Tunisia and Syria religious parties were repressed 
and the religious establishment was held under strict control – mosques’ imams 
were to be approved by the government –  in the Egyptian case a sort of coexistence 
with the religious establishment was set up (al-Azhar remained for the most 
autonomous): independent candidates related to the Muslim Brotherhood got 
a limited access to parliament and the organization was free to complement the 
state in the society by delivering social services by itself (Ben Néfissa 2007: 19). 
Only in the Egyptian and Tunisian cases the trade unions, at least at the lower 
levels, maintained a relative autonomy13.
10 They were mostly businessmen, religious and tribal leaders (Perthes 2004: 21).
11 This figure has to be divided between full membership, about 1/5 of the total members, and 
the “supporters” (nasir).
12 The figures for Egyptian NDP were more modest in relation to the population (probably 
eight times as much the Tunisian one): only 1.9 million of members at the moment of the re-
gime breakdown (http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/22/national-demo-
cratic-party). There was certainly an organizational problem given the demographic size of the 
country. However, in the Egyptian case, according to Ben Néfissa (2007: 18 and n. 48) clienteli-
stic exchange were directly controlled by MPs or by senior public officers, most of them party 
cadres. Such NDP dominance on local politics is proved by the last results of local elections 
(2002): the NDP gained nearly all the seats and in 60% of the cases unopposed.
13 The Syrian case was different as the unions became part of the party (Perthes 2004: 12).
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4. Systemic Differences: The Relations Among Army, Bureaucracy and the 
Party
Despite the fact that in all three cases the pillars of the ruling coalition supporting 
the regime were the same, significant differences ascribable to the role of the 
military in relation with the other institutions – the party and the bureaucracy 
– can be easily noticed. In short, while in Egypt “the military ruled but did not 
govern” (Cook 2007), in Tunisia they neither governed nor ruled, and in Syria 
they certainly governed and ruled.
In Tunisia, under Bourguiba, the army was kept separated from the other two 
institutions by forbidding to its members to join the party (Camau & Geisser 
2003: 165). The army remained an integral part of the ruling coalition up to the 
2011 revolt: the participation to the repression during the bread riots in 1984 is an 
example of that. However, unlike the Syrian and Egyptian cases, the members of 
the military were strictly excluded from government positions. Under Bourguiba, 
local governorships (wilayat) were led by members of the party, while under Ben Ali 
most of them were in the ranks of the Ministry of Interior. Similarly, the members 
of government coming from the same Ministry grew due to the security turn after 
the repression of the religious movement in the 90s. This event coincided with an 
important transformation of the relationships between the party and the state. The 
military kept the same position as regards the other two institutions previously 
held: they were able to negotiate the defense budget but were kept apart from the 
government and the party. What changed under the transition from Bourguiba 
to Ben Ali was the relation between the state and the party: if under Bourguiba 
the party – PSD at that time – occupied key posts inside the state institutions, 
the rise of Ben Ali marked the downsizing of the party as an instrument of policy 
decision and the rise of technocrats that for the most were not party cadres but 
were imposed to the party. The party remained altogether an important patronage 
machine at the peripheral levels, managing the redistribution of resources (Camau 
& Geisser 2003: 217). It is not by chance that the rise of technocrats coincided with 
the expansion of liberalization policies sponsored by the presidency that directly 
assumed the control of growing resources (Camau & Geisser 2003: 197).
Such separation of the army from the other institutions was only partial in the 
Egyptian case. In this case, the party was kept separated from the army but there 
was no separation between the army and the state. Members of the army were part 
of the government – they controlled the presidency – both through ministerial 
functions and local power (the governorships). Their downsizing in the central 
government (Cooper 1982) was balanced by their growing role in the economy14. 
In Egypt, the establishment of technocratic governments that followed the 
14 The Ministry of Defense and military production alone still employs about 40.000 people. 
It controls the military industry (about 100.000 additional employees). Some evaluations put 
about 1/3 of the civil production – infrastructures, services and first necessity goods – provided 
by factories controlled by retired members of the armed forces.
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liberalization policies that, similarly to the Tunisian case, reduced the functions 
of the hegemonic party (NDP) to a mere patronage machine concurred in fact to 
maintain and consolidate all the functions pertaining to the army including the 
economic ones. On one side, the army reduced its direct control on the party, on 
the other, it gained an increasing power of indirect control that was not affected 
by economic liberalization15. Actually if these policies eroded the NDP legitimacy 
to the advantage of religious networks, the capacities of the military apparatus to 
maintain consensus to the advantage of the system through the redistribution 
of essential goods remained unchanged. The army had grown as a state inside 
the state as central power reduced its redistributive capacity. As Richter (2007) 
affirms, it was the army that increasingly took care of the redistributive capacities 
that were once provided by the state, also thanks to its direct connection with 
external important resources (US funded military aid). However, this took 
place in competition with the religious networks. If liberalizations downsized 
public expenses (from 47 USD per person during 1980-85 to 37 in 2001-04) 
military expenses doubled thanks to the US aid; most of them as off-budget 
resources (Richter 2007: 184). Being a member of the army ensured a privileged 
position: the possibility of purchasing houses and goods at subsidized prices; the 
possibility for officers’ relatives to get access to an educational and health system 
separated from that of the public system which was growingly inefficient; the 
possibility for retired officers to get new remunerative jobs (Richter 2007: 185).
Such socio-economic role of the army was even more important in Syria 
where the army were deeply rooted in the society, even more than in Egypt (1 
man in arms every 43 citizens against 1 every 84). In Syria, the army directly 
controlled most of the important assets as the oil resources, partially excluded 
from the state budget. Liberalization had certainly an effect: the state ceased to be 
the main dispenser of services and the only employer. Here too, the liberalization 
policies had affected the redistributive capacity of the state through the party, 
especially in the rural areas16. It was under this perspective that important 
sectors of the army considered Lebanon as a source of personal income (Bar 
2006: 408). However, unlike Egypt, the fusion between bureaucracy, the party 
and the military was far deeper. Similarly to the case of PSD led by Bourguiba, 
the Ba‘ath had profoundly colonized the state in the years of Hafiz al-Assad and 
had penetrated the army already before its rise in 1970. However it was rather 
the army which came to dominate the party since the highest ranks of the 
army constituted also the highest ranks of the party and the most important 
sectors of local administration17. Such security control intensified in the 80s as 
15 It is not by chance that in the 90s cuts agreed with the IFIs reduced subsidies goods to citi-
zens by 14%, while the budget of the army increased by 22% (Bellin 2004: 148).
16 Still today about 1/3 of the workforce is employed in the agriculture and ¼ of GDP comes 
from this sector.
17 Except for Damascus, the governorships (muhafazat) were in fact governed by security com-
mittees composed by the governor of the province (usually a military man to be appointed by 
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security priorities pressed for a harsher control of the oppositions18. The fusion 
between state-party and the military was therefore thicker and dominated by the 
military19. Such power structure took also an “ethnic-confessional” look given the 
nature of the cleavages in Syria that are less significant in the other two cases20.
Table 1 summarizes the degree of fusion of the two institutions with the mili-
tary apparatus including the economic sector that in two cases was crucial for the 
army. In the Tunisian case, the exclusion of the army or of some of its members, 
even retired, from the economic sector marked an important difference compa-
red to the other two cases.
Tab.1 Ruling Coalitions at the Beginning of the Crisis: 
the Degree of Fusion with the Military Apparatuses
Countries State Party Economy
Egypt HIGH ABSENT HIGH
Syria HIGH HIGH HIGH
Tunisia ABSENT ABSENT ABSENT
These differences in the power structure of the ruling coalitions are partially due 
to different historical developments that we will briefly describe. By “fusion” we 
do not mean that party and army are to be considered as one single institution 
– also other authors (Bar 2006; Stacher 2012) point out that, to a certain extent, 
these institutions could be competitors21 – but that important members of one of 
them have positions of responsibility also in the other.
the Ministry of interior), the head of the local party and those in charge of the internal security 
(mukhabarat) (Perthes 2004: 12).
18 This followed the 1982 crisis which led to the harsh repression of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Hama. The repression caused at least 10.000 casualties.
19 For example, the promotions of the party needed the approval of the security apparatuses 
(Perthes 2004: 12).
20 The Syrian political set is complicated by the sectarian cleavages. Such condition is irrele-
vant in Egypt or Tunisia that are much more homogeneous or where only a regional prevalence 
can be noticed. In Syria, a series of historical circumstances that will not be investigated any 
further (see Batatu 1981 and 1999) determined the dominance of the security apparatuses and 
of the élite army units by the Alawi community (10-12% of the population). Alawi controlled 
up to 90% of the higher ranks of the security services (Zisser 1998; Van Dam 2011). The Sunni 
majority (60-70% of the population) was under-represented. However, according to Bar (2006) 
defining the Syrian regime as “Alawi” is incorrect (Bar 2006) as family strategies forced leading 
members in the regime to co-opt important Sunni families from Damascus and some Sunni 
rural governorships – in particular Der‘a and Dayr az-Zawr – were well-represented both in the 
party and in the highest ranks of the army at least until the beginning of the crisis.
21 For example, in Syria the party, to a certain extent, offered a certain protection to its mem-
bers from interferences by the security apparatuses. However, the same apparatuses gave a fi-
nal approval to the candidacy of party membership.
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Tunisia gained independence in 1956. It was the party (Neo-Destur, which 
later became PSD) that led the country to independence and it was within the 
party that factional fight occurred. Once this was resolved, under Bourguiba the 
party became an instrument for strengthening the state. Tunisia already had a 
bureaucratic apparatus which dated back to the beylical governments and which 
was strengthened by France (Ayubi 2009). After independence, the party became 
an instrument of mobilization and penetration of the society. It was the party 
that further extended the authority of the state. The army did not contribute to 
such strengthening while it kept an important role of regime guardianship.
Quite differently, the army became the main instrument of state strengthening 
both in Egypt and Syria, after the coup of the “free officers” (1952) and the 1970 
coup of Hafiz al-Assad. The latter put an end to a long period of political instability 
marked by a sequence of coups that had started in the 40s. The Ba‘ath dominance 
dates back to 1963 but between this date and 1970 another coup occurred as the 
result of factionalism in the army and in the party22. Syrian history, until that 
date, was marked by the slow party conquest of the army, however after al-Assad 
coup the factional conflict ended as the ethno-confessional dominance in the 
army had been finalized. Party dominance therefore preceded the military one. 
The party and the army fused together and strengthened a state that was up to 
that time very weak. In Syria, such fusion shows a pattern similar to that of some 
communist regimes (Perlmutter & Leogrande 1982):
a. Between the party and the army: while there is in the party a “military’ section 
that rules the role of the party in the army, the army dominance on the party 
rests on a structure that is quite more important: the Regional Command23. In 
the Regional Command, the military, although a minority at least since the X 
Congress (2005), were in any case the most influent members;
b. Between the party and the state: as the Bouguiba PSD, the Ba‘ath dominated 
the state and in particular its local branches. Under Bashar liberalization 
“technocratized” the government to the extent that there was a growing rise 
of technocrats in the government that were imposed to the party as it happe-
ned in the RCD of Ben Ali. However, local politics was still dominated by the 
party as it maintained a fundamental function of ruling patronage resources;
c. Between the military and the state: the military were still the most important 
actor. It absorbed a significant part of the state budget: it remained one of the 
22 The 1963 coup led to power the Ba‘ath as well as other nationalist formations. Only during 
1970 the Ba‘ath dominance was asserted.
23 The “Regional Command” must be read as the (Syrian) National command and is the equi-
valent of an executive command. Its name was due to the pan-Arab character of the party which 
is formally divided in “regional” branches (Iraqi, Syrian, Yemeni, etc.) that are theoretically su-
bordinated to a “National Command” that is inter-Arab. A sort of COMINTERN of the party that 
has virtually ceased to exist.
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most important employers and some government functions, even decentrali-
zed, were assigned to men in uniform. Furthermore, contrary to the Tunisian 
and Egyptian cases, the Syrian one did not show a clear separation between 
the functions of the Ministry of interior and that of defense. The first one was 
subordinate to the second and its highest ranks mostly came from the army. 
Finally, not only the presidential (republican) guard was positioned near the 
capital, like in the other two cases, but also most of the other élite units24.
In Egypt too, the politicization of the army strengthened the state, but the 
assertion of a hegemonic party occurred later (in 1962, after ten years from 
Nasser coup d’etat). Although the army was an extremely important actor whose 
functions were not limited to protect the regime as in Tunisia, its functions 
related to the party were much more limited than in the Syrian case. At least 
partially, formal distinctions between the army and the Ministry of interior were 
maintained25. The army remained the most important actor as it is confirmed by 
the transition. The army remained autonomous from the party and fused only at 
the top with the state.
If we now consider the four criteria of the institutionalization as described 
by Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies (1968: 12-24) – autonomy, 
internal coherence, complexity and adaptability – and apply them to the three 
organizations here examined, we can generally observe that the three systems 
were deeply modernized at the moment of crisis. For example, the degree of 
complexity of the institutions was at least formally relevant. All the institutions, 
including the party, could be classified as complex organizations made by sub-
unities which were functionally and hierarchically organized. However, some 
distinctions can be made:
a. Given the degree of institutional fusion in Syria, the despotic intervention 
was much more evident. Also its complexity was therefore affected, probably 
in the army itself. For Huntington (1968: 18), a political system is simple (the-
refore not complex) when it rests on the role played by individuals. A study 
by Chouet (1995) describes the Syrian nomenclature as strongly affected by 
parental and confessional interweaving. This influenced also the degree of 
coherence of the institutions. According to Huntington (1968: 22), “factionalism” 
is indeed a proxy for the low internal coherence of an organization;
24 As the 3rd and the 4th divisions.
25 In 2012 military expenses still exceeded those of the Ministry of interior (25.4 billion li-
ras against 22). However, the latter ones had multiplied by six in the last decade against the 
only doubling of those of the Ministry of defense. In 2012, the Ministry of interior employed 
800.000 people (ICG 2012: 10). The growing frustration of the military against Mubarak did not 
only derive from the succession perspective of Gamal but also from this slide of power in favor 
of the Ministry of interior which occurred in the last years of Mubarak.
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b. In the other two cases, the degree of autonomy between institutions was more 
pronounced. In the Tunisian case, the army was kept far from the other two. 
Moreover, the technocratization of the bureaucracy reduced the party role in 
the government. While this phenomenon is to be traced also in the other two 
regimes, it is more evident in the Tunisian case;
c. The party was the weakest organization in all three cases, in particular in the 
Tunisian and Egyptian cases. The party lacked autonomy as it was completely 
dependent from the state by performing only an ancillary role. While, in the 
Syrian case, government functions were still monopolized by the members 
of the hegemonic party in the other two cases, since the start of liberalization, 
the affiliation to the party were mostly subordinated to positions in the go-
vernment.26
As an overall effect of the fusion between institutions, the reform is virtually 
impossible. The state is controlled by an elite who worries about change. Changes 
on one side of the ruling coalition may endanger the coalition as such. In the 
next chapter we will see how liberalizations weakens the ruling coalitions and 
the resistance they incurred.
5. The Economic Dimension: The Effects of Liberalization
The liberalization policies were important because they modified power 
relations inside the ruling coalitions and affected differently the development of 
the following crises27. Generally, liberalization transformed such regimes from 
PAs (populist authoritarianisms) to PPAs (post-populist authoritarianisms). This 
implied a change in the social basis of the regimes: less statist and ‘popular’ and 
increasingly marked by cronyism and opportunity for private enrichment of the 
ruling élite (Hinnebusch 2006: 383-384). In the Egyptian and Tunisian cases, the 
liberalizations showed two distinct phases. First an “opening” (infitah) occurred 
under state initiative without external pressures (the IFIs). The state maintained 
26 The adaptability is probably the most difficult factor to analyze. In all three cases, the insti-
tutions had already overcome several crises. They were able in the past to overcome, at least 
partially, a generational crisis. With the exception of the dominant parties that had all collapsed 
during the recent regime crisis, the capacity of adaptation of the army and bureaucracy could 
be measured only ex-post after the transition. With the exception of the Syrian case where the 
regime breakdown was accompanied by the partial collapse of the bureaucracy, in Egypt and 
Tunisia such collapse has never occurred. The reason for that is not that executive authority 
was much more centralized in Egypt than in Syria, as argued by Stacher (2012: 94), but because 
fusion was far advanced in Syria and therefore less bureaucratic autonomy was found here than 
in Egypt.
27 Important works have been devoted on this issue such as Heydemann (2004) and most 
recently Haddad (2012).
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the control of the most important assets but considered favorably the private 
sector, especially small companies, as this would likely help to broaden consensus 
from the public sector (bureaucracy) and the working class to the small middle 
class of the private sector. That at least was the hope of incumbent regimes. In 
Egypt and Tunisia, policies were inspired by socialism – i.e., the nationalization 
of bank and industry sectors, in the Egyptian case, and the system of cooperatives 
in the Tunisian case – but such policies were abandoned in the 70s. In 1975, 
Sadat launched infitah which opened to the private and foreign investments 
and after 1970 the rise of Hédi Nouira as prime minister in Tunisia marked the 
departure from the previously experiences in socialism28. The political success 
of such policies was however limited. Governments clashed with the religious 
networks in the 80s which benefited from the support of the small middle class. 
In Syria, liberalization although firstly experienced by the end of the 80s, became 
a deliberate policy only during the last presidency, after 2000. Such second phase 
of liberalization which occurred in Egypt and Tunisia under Mubarak and Ben Ali 
were implemented with the contribution of IFIs and more deeply changed the 
internal balance of forces which supported the regime.
If the results of infitah were controversial from an economic point of view, 
they however accelerated the transformation of the party from an instrument of 
mobilization into a mere patronage machine. Furthermore, especially during the 
second phase, the one which started in the 90s, marked the rise of a technocratic 
élite at the top of the government and the party, in accordance with a PPA profile 
which was also required by the International community. Such measures 
implied to reduce the burden of food and other subsidies to enable governments 
to reduce debts.
In Egypt, the party transformation occurred already under Sadat at the 
beginning of the shift from a strict PA to a more PPA outlook. The “nasserist” 
party (ASU) changed by presidential instigation into a more faded ideological 
party (NDP). Although this change was initially contested by a faction of the party 
itself, the transformation was accomplished at the end of 1978 by 250 members 
of the Parliament who crossed the floor from the ASU to the NDP, followed by 
the dissolution of the ASU itself. This happened without major obstacles because 
the political class wanted to maintain the resources that directly derived from 
the presidency (Kassem 1999: 41). Curiously, the transition from Bourguiba’s 
PSD to Ben Ali’s RCD occurred ten years later almost in the same way. At the 
base the party remained substantially the same, what changed was the top. If we 
28 In Tunisia, the cooperative sector was limited to agriculture. At the end of 1968 about 1/3 
of the land was ruled through the cooperative system which regarded ¼ of the rural popula-
tion. However, since a good part of rural notables served in the PSD, thanks to their pressure, 
Bourguiba forced Ben Salah to resign from the Ministry of planning (Perkins: 150-1). In fact, 
considerable foreign investment flows took place only after the rise of Ben Ali. The years of 
“liberalism” under Bourguiba were characterized more by the mobilization of local resources. 
Camau and Geisser (2003:) still call it “autharchic capitalism”.
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consider the government positions between 1987 and 2001 under Ben Ali, only 
5% retained their posts which were held under Bourguiba and only 30% had been 
previously members of the PSD, as the promotion to administrative position in 
the new party was often subsequent to government appointment (Camau and 
Geisser 2003: 195). 
Something similar had happened in Syria during the last decade, although to a 
lesser extent. Anyhow, in all three cases, such “technocratization” at the top barely 
affected the party at the local level. Resistances came out especially in Syria and 
in Egypt. Respectively the X congress and the internal elections of NDP in 2007 
signaled the growing apprehension of the party leaders of losing control of the 
top positions in favor of a new class of businessmen and technocrats promoted 
by liberalization who were not so far party members (Ben Néfissa 2007: 23-24). 
In Egypt this new technocratic class looked mainly to Gamal Mubarak, the son of 
the president in charge, for support. Its rise was therefore strictly linked to the 
problem of succession. However, such class was feared also by the military who 
started to worrying to lose their veto power. Their worries joined those of the 
most despised party cadres that still depended from top prebends. In the Syrian 
case, it was Bashar himself who took care of these worries. As a consequence, the 
liberalization process was put under the strict control of the presidency.
Notwithstanding such resistances, technocratization at the top of the he-
gemonic parties altered the pivotal role previously played by parties as decision-
making was placed strictly in the hand of governments. Parties survived as 
instrument of cooptation but under the liberalization they were reduced to 
patronage machines. Militancy was no longer inspired by ideological commit-
ment but their growing numbers demonstrate their continued importance as 
an instrument to get access to state resources for an impoverished society. Their 
strength in the rural milieu is another sign of the new trend. Being the urban 
milieu the most favored by liberalization, the party became of secondary impor-
tance29. This does not stand out against the control exerted by the urban milieu 
on government. Simply what was reduced was the importance of the party.
In Syria, the effect of the liberalizations on the party was probably less 
relevant but nevertheless important. Three growing trends could be found in 
this case and in the others: a) more and more the government used independent 
technocrats outside the Ba‘ath, and membership in the party no longer guaranteed 
a promotion to the higher levels of the administration (Perthes 2004: 10);  b) the 
party though still “ruralized” (Batatu 1999) lost its ability to process peripheral 
demands as the liberalizations reversed the distributive policies in favor of the top 
urban elites (Perthes 2004: 26; Lund 2012a). In 2011, the rebellion against Bashar’s 
regime started from a rural district (Der‘a) which under Hafiz had been one of the 
major recipient of public resources and one of the strongholds in the Sunni area 
29 In Egypt electoral participation rates under authoritarianism were quite lower in the more 
affluent urban districts.
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(Van Dam 2011: 9); c) those who benefitted more from the liberalization was a 
“new guard” (Haddad 2004; Bar 2006) made of second generation members. This 
new generation, especially in the Syrian case, limited the access to the market 
for rivals. Liberalization had, therefore also an adverse effect on the private 
sector potentiality, as privatizations largely benefitted important members of 
the establishment that were more linked to powerful families (Haddad 2004; 
Heydemann 2004; Perthes 2004: 37).
If the party was the institution that benefited less from liberalization, 
since the military had grown as a state within the state, liberalization initially 
only marginally affected the military apparatus as a whole. Side effects on the 
military had been for the most indirect and limited but altogether important. 
Indeed, maintaining unaltered the power of the military implied the reducing 
of subsidies for the poorest classes or the opportunities for the power élite. 
Furthermore, they started to produce their effect quite later and only on the 
eve of the Arab uprising and for the most regarded only Egypt. Only later the 
liberalization started to danger military interests once new agreements signed 
with the IFIs implied a downsizing of the economic weight of the military. Any 
of such effects, however, must be excluded in the Tunisian case as its military 
was kept separated from the party and the government. In Egypt, the dormant 
opposition in the military apparatuses to the eventual rise of Gamal Mubarak 
is to be read in this perspective. Mubarak’s ousting from power, although risky, 
has been therefore an opportunity for the military to preserve privileges and an 
economic autonomous domain that was consistent with its nationalist ethos 
(Springborg 2011). In the Syrian case, in contrast with later developments, initial 
liberalization gave instead new opportunities for personal enrichment once 
Syrian army had been involved in the Lebanon economy (Perthes 2004: 54). Of 
course such advantages almost ended after Syria disengaged from Lebanon. In 
Syria effects were altogether marginal for two main reasons: a) liberalization 
came later and was put under strict control by the top; b) the weight of the army 
in the state was even heavier than in Egypt. If there has been any disagreement 
between the army and Mubarak before the crisis of 2011, this was not the case in 
Syria, since in this case the military apparatuses had allowed the succession from 
Assad to Bashar (Stacher 2012). In such case, it was the greater fragility of the 
Syrian economy compared to the Egyptian one that has been emphasized by the 
loss of Lebanon. The loss of a rental position have probably sped up the regime 
crisis since its redistributive capacities had been eroded without benefitting 
from the external aid that supported Egypt in crucial times30.
30  Also oil resources were running out. State capacities, as in the other two cases, mostly de-
pended on the state subventions for first needs goods or for housing. After the reduction of 
such subventions, the informal Damascus of the Sunni districts has exploded outside state con-
trol (Balanche 2012).
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6. Conclusions: Pattern of Transition and Potential Outcomes
In Tunisia and Syria regime crisis started in rural areas that used to be strongly 
penetrated by the hegemonic party: Sidi Bou Zid and Dera‘a respectively. This 
means that the party was no longer an effective instrument of cooptation, of 
citizen’s control and that was unable to efficaciously select peripheral demands. 
In the triangular relations among state (bureaucracy), party, and army, the party 
proved to be the weakest institution. The decline of the state, of its ruling and 
redistributive capacities, was especially evident as indicated by the decline of 
the party which had performed auxiliary functions in this regard. However, in 
the case of the army this was only partially true. There was no decline of the 
army at least in relation to the state, while there had been a general decline of 
the controlling capacities of repressive apparatuses. That happened also in Syria 
(Bar 2006). This was probably the result of the social-economic changes that were 
influenced by the liberalizations:
a. In Syria and Egypt, the high growing demographic rates and, in all three ca-
ses a sharp increase of urbanization. The state was incapable of providing 
growing services (first of all jobs) whereas the party reduced its power of con-
trolling and ruling demands. Consequently, also the repressive apparatuses 
lost their efficacy while the religious networks expanded their action by sup-
porting poor urbanized people (ICG 2004; Balanche 2012);
b. Liberalizations mainly benefitted affluent strata and only partially the middle 
class. The middle class of the public sector too suffered of the economic decli-
ne (Ben Néfissa 2007: 16) despite governments continued, especially in Syria 
and Egypt, to maintain a set of subsidies for the public sector. In the Tuni-
sian case, and partially also in Egypt, public sector middle class soon joined 
the young demonstrators in the protest whereas this did not occur in Syria 
for two reasons: the greater dependence from the regime and the nature of 
the confessional cleavages due to the considerable weight of both Alawis and 
Christians in the bureaucracy31.
Patterns of transitions depend on the different weight of the military in relation 
to state and the party. In Syria and Egypt, the military is the actor that had to lose 
most from a regime change. We can summarize these patterns by saying that 
while the military “accelerated” the transition in the Tunisian case, in Egypt the 
transition was “put under control” by the military and “hampered” in the Syrian 
case. Similar conclusions are reached also by Lutterbeck (2011).
31 About 80% of the workforce in the coast areas where Alawis concentrate is employed in the 
public sector. The Christian component is also strong in the highest rank of the central admi-
nistration.
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In Tunisia, the army went rapidly back to the barracks after the transition. In 
Egypt, the army remained as one of the main actors behind the scene notwith-
standing that the FJP, the religious party, secured both parliamentary and presi-
dential elections in 2011-12. In Egypt, transition passed through different insti-
tutional crisis: between the presidency and the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF) and the presidency and the Constitutional court32. Such institution-
al conflicts finally ended in July 2013 with the arrest of president Morsi by the 
army. Having facilitated the starting of the transition, the military again inter-
vened to alter the process. This proved again the central role of the military factor 
in the Egyptian political system and the strength of the army which as an institu-
tion was placed above the former president Mubarak. The Syrian case is different.
While in Tunisia the army was kept separated from the other two institutions, 
whereas in Egypt a separation was clear only in relation to the party, in Syria the 
boundaries between the three institutions were not clearly defined. As a result of 
such “fusion” transition has been impossible. As a result, Syria is suffering from 
a civil war which is growingly characterized by a confessional/territorial factor 
(Lund 2012b). 
Transitions already in place such as those of Tunisia and Egypt showed 
important differences. In Tunisia, the discontinuity from the previous regime 
is clearer – the dissolution of the former hegemonic party and the absence of a 
political role of the military – whereas in Egypt continuities are more evident: the 
hegemonic party was dissolved but it was still possible for its members to run for 
elections; while the military still continues to play a political role. The former 
looks like a “replacement”; the latter a “transplacement” (Huntington 1991: 142-
163). In October 2011 Tunisians elected a constituent assembly which passed a 
new constitution in January 2014 after long discussions. New political elections 
are expected probably by the end of 2014. Egypt has proceeded along a different 
path: a new parliament and a new presidency have appointed a Constituent 
Assembly, subsequently a coup d’état followed and a second constitution has been 
approved in January 2014.
As we tried to demonstrate, structures of power of the previous regimes are 
fundamental in understanding the following path of transition. What happened 
in Egypt with the ousting of Mubarak from power resembles what was argued 
by Linz and Stepan (1996: 66-68) about the role of the “hierarchical” military 
(i.e. “military as institution”): when a regime is ruled by military hierarchy and 
this feels threatened as institution, it could exert pressure on the “military at 
the government” so that they resign from the political life starting “liberating 
elections”. However, they could impose, as the price for political liberalization, the 
preservation of “reserved dominions” and the prolongation of transition (Linz 
32 In August 2012, conflict between the SCAF and the presidency started after the presidency 
announcement to eliminate the constitutional amendments passed onto the SCAF to limit the 
power of the President of the republic. This was followed by the resignation of Gen. Tantawi 
from chief of the armed forces.
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and Stepan 1996: 56 and 61). This negative situation for an emerging democracy 
could be challenged only if democratic actors were strong. Notwithstanding the 
existence of an autonomous civil society and a working judiciary (Rutherford 
2008), the capacity of such development remains however uncertain and all the 
questions which Ottaway (2004) raises about the absence in the Arab world of 
favorable democratic constituencies remains relevant, at least in Egypt.
Tunisia is different. We said that in this case ruptures had been more apparent. 
No political meddling by the military has been recorded after the ousting of Ben 
Ali. Civil society is broader here. Demographic pressures although important 
are less disruptive and social-economic indicators more promising. In this case, 
concerns regard a deterioration of the polarization between the secular and 
the religious camps after attempts of creating a common secular front seem to 
be successful. However, also in this case, the coming out from a condition of 
economic crisis will prove to be the most important factor for the achievement 
of the transition. Maybe the geographical distance from the Middle-East and 
its complex geopolitical situation, particularly after the outbreak of the Syrian 
crisis, will help the Maghreb to stabilize.
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